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INTRODUCTION
Imagine spending tens of thousands of dollars on expert witness fees to prosecute a trademark infringement case. Imagine
spending tens of thousands more dollars developing the demonstrative evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case—evidence
that includes a consumer survey to be proffered as proof that the
defendant’s infringement has created actual trademark confusion.
Now imagine the judge rejecting the survey because it fails to
identify the relevant universe of consumers. Your case is sunk!
Too often, litigants engage in such costly and time-consuming
evidence generation that is of little or no value at trial. Trademark
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surveys are expensive,1 hence they should be constructed carefully
with emphasis on identifying the relevant universe of consumers.2
As with any survey, in order to be probative or dispositive, the
proper class of respondents must be interviewed.3 Because the
crux of any trademark infringement case is the infringing mark’s
effect on the typical consumer, a survey is normally required to
measure that effect.4 Consequently, failure to properly identify the
relevant group or universe of consumers in a trademark survey can
be fatal to the trademark holder’s case.5
This Article explains the ways in which identification of the
relevant universe of consumers is an integral part of a trademark
holder’s infringement case. Part I discusses the reasons for employing trademark surveys to establish trademark infringement.
Part II examines the policies that underlie the prevention of consumer confusion and develops the temporal relationship theory and
the spatial relationship theory to explain when consumer confusion
occurs. Part III analyzes various types of consumers to identify
their roles in the relevant universe of consumers in various situations. Part IV analyzes cases in which the court has determined the

1. See Trademarks: Protection of Merchandising Properties in Professional Sports,
21 DUQ. L. REV. 927, 961 (1983) (reporting that preparation of a consumer survey presented in a trademark case cost in excess of $500,000).
2. See Helene D. Jaffe, Avoiding the Pitfalls: Use of Consumer Surveys in Lanham
Act Cases, 8 SUM. ANTITRUST 30, 32 (1994) (stating that the first step in conducting a
survey is to define the universe of consumers who actually purchase or use the products
in question); see also Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that purchasers of defendant’s
products ought to be the appropriate universe for a survey).
3. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976)
(finding that in a survey applied to light bulbs, flashlights, and batteries, the universe
consisted of the general population); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513
(10th Cir. 1987) (finding that in a survey applied to fishing reels, the universe consisted
of persons over 14 years of age who had fished in fresh water in the previous 12 months);
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc. 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that in a
survey applied to airplane parts, the universe consisted of all owners of private airplanes,
regardless of whether they did their own repair work).
4. See Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark Litigation, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 479-80 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (according no value to consumer survey results because
the survey failed to test the proper universe of consumers).
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evidentiary effect of a survey based on an improper universe. This
Article concludes that failure to identify the proper universe can be
fatal to a survey proponent’s case.
I. TRADEMARK SURVEYS ARE USED TO ESTABLISH TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT
A trademark is a powerful commercial tool that assures consumers they will get exactly what they want.6 A trademark also
identifies a particular product and associates that product with a
particular source or manufacturer.7 Consequently, in the market
context, a trademark can shorten shopping time because a consumer can recognize the desired product by mark alone, rather than
by examination of the entire label and packaging.8
Such reduction in shopping time can occur only when the mark
maintains a grip on the consumer’s mind.9 Corporations spend
millions of dollars on advertising to implant specific product or
service characteristics within the minds of target customers.10
Trademark law seeks to protect this intangible asset, which is carried around in the minds of consumers.

6. See Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Trademark Act to Prohibit the
Importation of All Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59, 84 n.156 (1996).
Often times, however, consumers do not get exactly what they want because even identically trademarked goods are of inferior quality. See id.
7. See Keds Corp. v. Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that because a trademark owner spends time, money, and energy in presenting its
product to the public, the owner’s investment should be protected from misappropriations
by pirates and cheats).
8. See William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987). Landes and Posner provide examples of this phenomenon. Id. at 268-70. According to Landes and Posner, allowing another decaffeinated coffee manufacturer to use the name “Sanka” would destroy any benefit in having an
identifying brand name. Id. at 269. If consumers have a positive experience with a particular brand, it is more efficient for them to simply purchase the product by its trademark. See id. at 269.
9. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 2:5, 3:6 (4th ed. 1996); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83
F.3d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1996).
10. See Golden Bear Int’l v. Bear USA, 969 F. Supp. 742, 744 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(stating that trademark holder spent over thirty five million dollars advertising the clothing).
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Knowing that a trademark can maintain such a grip on the
minds of consumers, a marketer often mimics a trademark or trade
dress11 in order to obtain a free ride on the reputation of the primary mark holder. This is often referred to as trading off the
goodwill of others.12 A mere similarity between two trademarks,
however, does not mean that there is trademark infringement.13
Rather, to establish trademark infringement, the trademarks must
be confusingly similar to the relevant public, that is, in the minds
of the relevant consumers.14
The analytical construct for trademark infringement necessarily
examines the mark in question; it must be distinctive in order to receive protection. The trademark holder can sue for infringement
only if the mark is distinctive.15 Distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired. Coined,16 fanciful,17 arbitrary,18 or suggestive
11. Trade dress generally refers to the products packaging, labeling, or containerization. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Jamison Dean
Newberg, The Same Old Enchilada? The Supreme Court Simplifies the Protection of Inherently Distinctive Trade Dress in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 13 REV. LITIG. 299
(1994).
12. Trademark law is premised on the idea that when a party has expended resources to develop an identification for its product, it is not equitable to allow another to
trade on that party’s goodwill and reputation to promote his own goods or services. See
Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What’s Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes
with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 829 (1997).
13. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that others can produce designs similar to the trademark as long as there is no likelihood of consumer confusion).
14. See Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861
(5th Cir. 1967) (“Confusion, or the likelihood of confusion . . . is the real test of trademark infringement.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 23:1.
15. See Weight Watchers Int’l v. Stouffer Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321, 1328-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
16. A coined mark is an artificial word that has no language meaning except as the
mark. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976). For example, “KODAK” has no language equivalent and is a purely invented
word. See Big O Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 408 F. Supp. 1219, 1242-43
(D. Col. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
17. A fanciful mark is an invented word also but has some relationship to another
word. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. For example, “FAB” is shortened for fabulous
but “FAB” in and of itself has no language meaning. See Big O Tire Dealers, 408 F.
Supp. at 1242-43.
18. An arbitrary word has a real language counterpart but does not describe or suggest the underlying product by use of the word. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. For ex-
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marks19 are inherently distinctive. On the other hand, descriptive
marks are not inherently distinctive and thus, to receive protection,
such marks must acquire secondary meaning.20 Generic marks are
never entitled to protection, as they are purely descriptive of the
products.21 Once a mark is deemed protectable, the mark holder
may avail himself of the trademark infringement laws.
A. Consumer Surveys and the Test for Likelihood of Confusion
Traditional trademark infringement analysis begins with the
likelihood of confusion test.22 The elements of the test vary among

ample, “APPLE” is a mark for computers in addition to having an everyday language
counterpart, namely the fruit.
19. A suggestive mark is a word that suggests what the product is without actually
describing it. See id. For example, “STRONGHOLD” suggests that the underlying
product holds something together strongly but does not describe whether the product is a
nail, screw, adhesive, glue, Velcro, or a bolt. See Big O Tire Dealers, 408 F. Supp. at
1242-43.
20. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9-10. The primary meaning of a word is the pure
description of it; the secondary meaning of a word may cause the product-source association. For example, the primary meaning of “IVORY” is what an elephant’s tusk is made
of, whereas, the secondary meaning is the association that “IVORY” is a brand name of
soap. Secondary meaning is shown when the public has come to associate the total image
of the mark with one source. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
851 n.11, 214 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1982).
21. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. Generic marks identify the product. See id.
For example, “Aspirin,” “Kleenex,” “Thermos,” and “Elevator” have fallen victim to
genericide. See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (Dec. Com.
Pat. 1950) (canceling “escalator” trademark as becoming generic); King-Seeley Thermos
Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 138 U.S.P.Q. 349 (2d Cir. 1963) (“Thermos”);
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.C.N.Y. 1921) (“Aspirin”); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 30 U.S.P.Q. 332 (2d Cir.) (“Cellophane”),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601, 299 U.S.P.Q. 601 (1936); Coca Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 162 F.2d 280, 73 U.S.P.Q. 518 (1st Cir.) (“Cola”), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 809, 75
U.S.P.Q. 365 (1947).
22. See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The
trademark statute does not give the appellants any ‘property right’ in their mark except
‘the right to prevent confusion.’”). The likelihood of confusion test was first coined in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), where the court
stated the factors to be (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between
the marks; (3) the proximity of the goods; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting
the mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s products; and (8) the sophistication of the
buyers. Id. These eight factors are referred to as the Polaroid Factors.
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the several circuits.23 Nevertheless, the proper identification of the
consumer is a common theme underlying several elements in the
test. Most often, the identification of the consumer is part of the
sophistication-of-the-consumer element or the evidence-of-actualconfusion element in the test. Because a trademark survey typically is used to establish these elements, properly identifying the
consumer is a significant concern. In short, strong consumer survey results can counter a defendant’s argument that the plaintiff

23. Although the factors are generally the same, circuits vary as to the wording and
number of factors. See, e.g., Pignons SA de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp.,
657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981); Western Publishing Co. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910
F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,
1229 (3rd Cir. 1978); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir.
1984); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975); Frisch’s Restaurants v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982);
Nike Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993); SquirtCo v. Seven Up
Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341,
348 (9th Cir. 1979); Beer Nuts v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir.
1983); Dieter v. B & H Indus., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989); In re EI duPont, 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917
F.2d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The D.C. circuit looks to guidance from the Ninth,
Seventh, and Second Circuits. See Delmatoff, Gerow, Morris, Langhans, Inc. v. Children’s Hospital Nat’l Med. Center, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1136, 1139 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Carl
Karcher Enters. v. Stars Restaurants Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1125, 1128 (T.T.A.B. 1995).
The most extensive list of factors used in the test is from In re E.I. du Pont, 476 F.2d
1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) wherein the court stated that the following thirteen factors
must be examined: (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the similarity of dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration or
in connection with which a prior mark is in use; (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely to continue trade channels; (4) the conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, that is, impulse versus careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) the
fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use); (6) the number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion;
(8) the length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use
without evidence of actual confusion; (9) the variety of the goods on which a mark is or
is not used (house mark, family mark, product mark); (10) the market interface between
the applicant and the owner of the prior mark: (i) a mere consent to register; (ii) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, for example, limitations on continued
use of the marks by each party; (iii) assignment of a mark, application registration, and
goodwill of the related business; and (iv) laches and estoppel attributable to the owner of
the prior mark and indicative of lack of confusion; (11) the extent to which applicant has
right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of potential confusion, whether de minimus or substantial; or (m) any other established fact probative to
the effect of use. Id.
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failed to prove actual confusion.24
B. Consumer Surveys and the Requirements for Protectable
Marks
Consumer identification is significant in determining whether
the putative mark warrants any protection. For example, it is
axiomatic that descriptive marks are not protectable without showing acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.25 Accordingly, when faced with a contestable trademark,26 a defendant
will always argue that the mark warrants no protection unless the
trademark holder proves secondary meaning. Suggestive marks,
on the other hand, are protectable without this showing.27 Secondary meaning can be established by showing survey evidence, the
length and manner of use of the name, the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the name, the volume of sales, and in24. See, e.g., Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 813 (5th
Cir. 1989) (finding that it is not necessary to demonstrate actual confusion in order to
prevail on a trade dress infringement claim); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that it would be “exceedingly difficult to detect instances of actual confusion when, as here, the goods are relatively inexpensive and their actual properties are exactly identical”); Brunswick Corp. v.
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 521 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that a fining of no actual confusion is not fatal to a case); Union Carbide Corp .v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383
(7th Cir. 1976) (holding it unnecessary to show actual confusion).
25. Under the incontestable mark provisions of the Lanham Act, Trademark Act of
1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)), an incontestable mark cannot be challenged on
the grounds that the mark is descriptive. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994). Therefore, the proprietor of a disputably descriptive mark should file the necessary affidavits to transform
the mark into an incontestable one. An incontestable descriptive mark owner need not
proffer any evidence of secondary meaning.
As another note, registered trademark infringement is governed by section 32(1) of
the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). Trade dress, unregistered mark infringement, and
unfair competition are governed by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. § 1125(a).
Also, the new federal dilution statute is governed by section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. Id.
§ 1125(c).
26. See id. § 1065. Under this provision, an allegedly descriptive mark becomes
incontestable once the section 8 and section 15 affidavits are filed and accepted. Id.
Therefore, a defendant cannot defeat the mark by alleging descriptiveness because descriptiveness is not one of the enumerated defenses. See id. § 1115(b) (listing the sole
grounds for challenging the validity of an incontestable mark).
27. See Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball v. NBA Properties, 952 F. Supp.
1084, 1092-93 (D.N.J. 1997).
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stances of actual confusion.28 Consumer identification in properly
conducted surveys will prove secondary meaning and bestow protection to a descriptive mark.
C. The Role of the Survey in a Dilution Claim
Consumer identification plays a role in establishing dilution.
The Lanham Act29 defines dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous trademark to identify and distinguish goods and
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and the other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”30 Dilution occurs
when tarnishment31 or blurring32 erodes a famous mark’s power to
identify and distinguish goods and services.33 Dilution applies
only to famous marks, that is, marks with a high degree of recognition among the relevant consumers in the trade.34 Therefore, in a
28. See Security Center v. First Nat’l Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th
Cir. 1985).
29. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1988 & Supp. 1988)).
30. Id. § 1127.
31. Tarnishment arises when a famous trademark is linked to goods of poor quality,
or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering beliefs about the owner or its products. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 1183, 1191 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. Blurring typically involves the “whittling away of an established trademark’s
selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products.”
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d
Cir. 1989).
33. See Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of
Travel, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1161, 1166 (1997).
34. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1030. The elements in determining whether the
putative mark is famous includes:
(i) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (ii) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods; (iii) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (iv) the geographical
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (v) the channels of trade
for the goods with which the mark is used; (vi) the degree of recognition of the
mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks’ owner and
the person against whom the [injunction] is sought; (vii) the nature and extent
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (viii) whether the mark
was registered under the Trademark Act of 03 March 1881, or the Trademark
Act of 20 February 1905, or on the principal register.
Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1908, 1913 (C.D.
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dilution case, because the mark must be famous, the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas or channels of trade is of
key importance. In any case, any party seeking to proffer a trademark survey at trial must first determine the persons to whom the
mark is famous.
In sum, the dilution, likelihood of confusion, and secondary
meaning tests require the parties to determine the relevant universe
of consumers who would be confused by an infringing mark. Only
when the relevant universe of consumers is clearly identified can
the parties complete a trademark survey. More courts are insisting
on surveys to evidence the likelihood of confusion, the fame, or the
secondary meaning of marks.35 Failure to produce such a survey,
or producing a defective survey, is inevitably fatal to the survey
proponent’s case.36 It is noteworthy that in one case in which neither party produced any consumer survey, a judge admonished the
attorneys for both for laxity.37 But failure to produce a survey may
cause more then embarrassment for lawyers; it may preclude a
finding of actual confusion.38
D. Evidentiary Rules for Surveys: Making the Proper Proffer
Because judges give great weight to the results of a survey,39
the implication is that plaintiffs and defendants should proffer a
Cal. 1996).
35. See Jones, supra note 4; Helene D. Jaffee & Robert G. Sugarman, The Use of
Experts and Survey Evidence in Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, 463 PLI/PAT. 477, 477 (1996).
36. See Jaffee & Sugarman, supra note 35, at 477.
37. See Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, 213 U.S.P.Q. 1005, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1982),
aff’d on other grounds, 699 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Eagle Snacks, Inc. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 571, 583 (D.N.J. 1985); Springs Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 532 F. Supp. 1203, 1218 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, 689 F.2d
1127 (2d Cir. 1982). Failure to produce a survey while having the economic resources to
do so is not looked upon fondly. See Information Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine,
492 F. Supp. 147, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
38. See Essence Communications, Inc. v. Singh Indus., 703 F. Supp. 261, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). The lack of survey evidence counts against finding actual confusion.
See Casa Editrice Bonechi, SRL v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1417, 1425
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting strong disfavor with the plaintiff who produced evidence of actual confusion by testimony but failed to produce a survey or opinion poll).
39. See 2 T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 32:55 (2nd ed.
1984).
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proper survey to prove or refute the issues at trial. Thus the use of
a survey is not without its own attendant problems.40 Because a
survey measures within a certain degree of statistical deviation,41
the criteria for the trustworthiness of survey evidence are extensive.42 First, the universe must be properly defined.43 Second, a
representative sample of that universe must participate in the survey.44 Third, the questions asked of respondents must be framed in
a clear, precise, and non-leading manner.45 Fourth, the survey
must be a double-blind study, that is, sound interview procedures
must be followed by competent interviewers who have no knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for which the survey is being
conducted.46 Fifth, the data gathered must be reported accurately.47 Sixth, the data must be analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles.48 Finally, the whole process must be
conducted objectively.49
As with any other type of evidence, the survey is subject to attack. The most common attacks include objections for hearsay,
bias, and inadequate definition of the universe of respondents.50

40. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 684, 137
U.S.P.Q. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366,
385-88 (7th Cir. 1976). The survey data must assure the trier of fact of its reliability and
also act as a basis of foundation for expert testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
41. See William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring a plaintiff to show that a statistically significant part of the consuming public was
mislead in a false advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
42. See Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321, 1330-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
43. See id. at 1330.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1330-31.
46. See id. at 1331.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED
CASES, reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 351, 429 (1960) (stating the guidelines for the admissibility of survey evidence). Because this Article focuses on the definition of the universe and
the survey methodology, with the exception of the following text, it does not discuss bias
in the questions. Objections to questions premised on bias tend to focus on the use of
leading questions or the sequence of questions asked; some questions tend to dupe the
respondent into responding wrongly or improperly. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Quaker
Oats Co., 169 U.S.P.Q. 508, 509 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Wuv’s Int’l, Inc. v. Love’s Enters.,
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Hearsay objections are most often summarily dismissed.51
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROHIBITING CONFUSION
Trademark and trade dress law are designed to protect consumers from confusingly similar marks.52 Generally, it is believed that
consumers are unable to distinguish between different products.
As a result, they require re-education each time they purchase a
product. Therefore, trademark protection allows the trademark
holder to distinguish its own goods from those of its competitors
by creating a public association with the goods.53 In this manner,
the public association creates the goodwill.54
208 U.S.P.Q. 736, 755 (D. Col. 1980) (noting that a survey question deliberately suggested that plaintiff’s restaurants may be connected with another commercial entity identified as a restaurant); Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Sears, Roebuck v. All States Life Ins., 246 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir.
1957) (noting that the sequence of the questions, rather than the questions themselves,
tainted the results of the survey); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 141
U.S.P.Q. 400, 404 (T.T.A.B. 1964) (noting that the survey questions referred to the pending litigation and phrased questions in a manner sympathetic to the litigation).
51. According to the definition of hearsay in Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, does not apply because the survey is designed for what the respondent believes,
rather than the truth of what they believe. FED. R. EVID. 801 In addition, Rule 803(1) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence allows for an exception to hearsay in that it allows for a
present sense impression, id. 803(1), such as the statement, “These marks are confusing
to me.” Similarly, Rule 803(3) allows an exception for the respondent’s state of mind.
Id. 803(3). Finally, the catch-all provision of Rule 803(24) allows for a liberal construction of the rules and subsequent admission of the survey. Id. 803(24); see also Casa Editrice Bonechi, SRL v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1417, 1424-25 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Casa Editrice, the court recognized that “hearsay evidence has traditionally been considered by courts evaluating actual confusion–surveys and opinion polls,
for example, though technically hearsay, are admissible to show evidence of actual confusion.” Casa Editrice, 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1424-25 n.12. In addition, “the evidence is not
hearsay to the extent that the testimony evidences or otherwise expresses customers’
then-existing state of mind, to wit, their confusion as to the source of plaintiff’s goods.”
Id.
52. See Peaches Entertainment Corp. v. Entertainment Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d
690, 692 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Lanham Act was designed to protect both consumer’s confidence in quality and source of goods and the right holder’s goodwill in their
products).
53. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 828.
54. See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274, 192
U.S.P.Q. 555 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that a trademark itself is not infringed, rather the
right of the public to be free of confusion and the right of the trademark owner to control
his product’s reputation is infringed).
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The congressional purpose behind the Lanham Act mimics the
general rule of protecting the consumers and the goodwill of the
mark.55 Congress maintains that it must provide the public with a
trustworthy technique for identifying products, thereby permitting
the public to distinguish products.56 Similarly, the trademark
owner is rewarded for the time, effort, and money spent in presenting the product to the public.57 Trademark owners are protected
from misappropriation by pirates and cheats.58 In short, trademark
law seeks to protect the public from deceit, foster fair competition,
and secure to businesspersons the advantages of their reputation
and goodwill.59
A. Establishing Consumer Confusion
To protect both the public and private interests in an infringement action, the mark holder must establish consumer confusion.60
There are three types of actionable confusion: (1) confusion as to
the source, (2) confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation, and (3)
reverse confusion.61

55. The congressionally stated purpose for protecting trademarks under the Lanham
Act is “to protect the public from deceit, to foster competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by preventing their diversion
from those who have created them to those who have not.” S. REP. NO. 79-1333, 79th
Cong., at 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275.
56. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1297, 1300 (D.C. Cir.
1992). According to Representative Fritz G. Lanham, the sponsor of the Lanham Act,
one purpose of the statute was “to protect the public so that it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark, with [sic] it favorably knows, it will
get the product which it asks for and wants to get.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at
2 (1945)).
57. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 829.
58. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1081,
1090 n.19 (1992) (J. Stevens, concurring).
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3. According to House Report 219, “Trade-marks
encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good
reputation which excellence creates.” Id.
60. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, 64 F.3d 1055, 1060, 36 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff must establish a likelihood of confusion in
order to succeed in the infringement action).
61. See 3 A.R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES, §
20.01-.03 (4th ed. 1983); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23.1.
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1. Source Confusion
Source confusion occurs when there is a mistaken belief that
the junior user’s62 goods originate from the source of goods marketed under the senior user’s mark.63 That is, the confusion occurs
when a consumer believes that the junior user’s product is actually
the senior user’s product.64 To prove infringement, the public need
not know the identity of the senior source because it is sufficient
that the public believes both products emanate from the same
source.65 This is known as the anonymous source rule.66
2. Affiliation Confusion
In contrast to confusion as to the source, confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation67 most commonly occurs when the consuming
public believes that the junior user’s product is somehow affiliated,
sponsored, or connected with the senior user.68 Affiliation confusion is easier to prove if the marks are used on similar or related
products, but more difficult if the relation between the products is
attenuated. To establish the likelihood of confusion, the test is not
whether the goods are identical or competitive in nature. Rather, it
is sufficient that the goods are related in some manner, or that they
might both end up in a purchaser’s hands who reasonably believes

62. For the sake of clarity, unless otherwise noted, a senior user is assumed to be the
rightful trademark holder and the first entrant in the field. In contrast, a junior user is assumed to be the alleged infringer and most often the second comer into the field.
63. See McCoy v. Mutsuboshi Cutlery, 67 F.3d 917, 923-24, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1289
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (involving confusion as to the source of genuine goods), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1174 (1996).
64. See David S. Welkowitz, The Problem of Concurrent Use of Trademarks: An
Old/New Proposal, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 315 (1994).
65. See A. Samuel Oddi, Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law: On the Importance of Source, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).
66. See Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The anonymous source rule is directed to the situation where a typical buyer would not
know the corporate identity of the source. See id.
67. See, e.g., Equine Techs. v. Equitechnology, 68 F.3d 542, 544, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1659 (1st Cir. 1995) (sponsorship confusion).
68. See Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir. 1993).
Customer “confusion” is not restricted to a mistake regarding the source of the goods;
courts also consider whether the customer would believe that the trademark owner sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise affiliated with the product. See id.
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that the goods have a common origin because of the identical
trademarks.69 Nonetheless, there is no clear resolution of how related the parties’ goods must be for the use of similar trademarks to
be actionable.70 Hence, courts will most likely afford stronger protection against use on a broader range of goods, especially where
the junior user’s mark is identical to that of the senior user’s.71
3. Reverse Confusion
Reverse confusion, in contrast to both source and affiliation
confusion, occurs when the marks used by the parties causes the
public to believe that the senior user’s products emanate or are
sponsored by the junior user.72 Reverse confusion is best illustrated by way of example. In Big O Tires Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,73 Big O Tires Dealers, Inc. (“Big O”)
brought action against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”)
alleging violations of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.74 Big O
was a tire buying organization, with a net worth of about $200,000,
that operated in about fourteen states.75 Goodyear, the world’s
largest tire manufacturer, had sales in the billions.76 Big O was the
senior user of the “Bigfoot” mark on tires.77 The reverse confusion
69. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Suave Shoes Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1618, 1624
(T.T.A.B. 1989).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Big O Tires Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365,
1371, 195 U.S.P.Q. 417 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball v. NBA Properties, 952 F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1997); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated
Dept. Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1988); Yarmuth Dion v. D’Ion Furs,
835 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1987); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s BR Others, Inc., 826 F.2d
837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754
F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1985); Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999,
1003-04 (2d Cir. 1983); Master Card Int’l, Inc. v. Arbel, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1958, 1963-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F.
Supp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 247 (1918); Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551,
555-56 (N.D. Ill. 1984); cf. Jeffrey v. Cannon Films, Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1373, 1381-82
(D. Col. 1987).
73. 561 F.2d 1365, 195 U.S.P.Q. 417 (10th Cir. 1977).
74. Id. at 1367.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1368
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occurred when Goodyear started using “Bigfoot” also.78 Due to
the sheer size and market penetration of Goodyear, the consuming
public wrongly believed that Goodyear was the senior user and that
Big O was somehow affiliated or sponsored by Goodyear.79
Reverse confusion typically occurs in situations where the second-comers, such as Goodyear, use their size and market penetration in an attempt to overwhelm the first, but smaller, user.80 If reverse confusion were not prohibited, notwithstanding the senior
user’s prior use, the senior user would lose control of its mark and
the goodwill created by the mark, when a junior, but larger, user
utilizes the mark.81 Moreover, because the Lanham Act seeks to
minimize public confusion,82 it attempts to prevent the public from
being deceived into believing that the senior user’s product emanates from, or is sponsored by, the junior user.83
B. Temporal and Spatial Relationship Theories
After recognizing the types of actionable confusion that can
occur, the next inquiry delves into when such confusion can be
measured. In any purchase time line, there are three distinct stages
related to the purchase. First is the pre-purchase time period when
the purchaser is contemplating the purchase or is being influenced
to make a purchase. The second time frame is the actual purchase.
This is the in-store period and is frequently known as the point of
sale or point of purchase.84 The actual time of the purchase is the
only readily ascertainable period in the time line. By contrast, it is
nearly impossible to determine exactly when the consumer began
to contemplate the purchase. The final time period is the post-sale
period, which normally is associated with the use of the product or

78. See id.
79. See id. at 1371-72.
80. See id. at 1371
81. See id.
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219 (1945).
83. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (describing the goals of the Lanham Act).
84. See generally Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality:
Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 817 (1992) (discussing point-of-sale
activities).
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service or the time when others view the purchase.85 It is similar to
pre-purchase period in that it is difficult to ascertain when any
post-purchase confusion ends.
Consumer confusion can be measured under both a temporal
and a spatial relationship. In the temporal relationship theory, confusion vests when the confusion occurs in the purchase time line,
given that the time of purchase is fixed. The temporal relationship
does not distinguish between the purchaser and non-purchaser per
se because this theory only inquires whether actionable confusion
existed during the pre-purchase, point of purchase, or postpurchase time. On the other hand, the spatial relationship theory
identifies the relationship between the confused person and the
point of purchase person. In other words, the spatial relationship
theory determines the degree of privity that exists between the purchaser and others. Given that the time of the purchase is fixed, this
theory queries which of the consumers related to the purchaser
may have some actionable confusion.
These theories are best illustrated by way of example. Suppose
a parent goes to a toy store to purchase a toy for her child. If we
were to freeze time at the point of purchase, the temporal relationship theory will determine whether the parent who buys the toy
was confused before walking into the store, while purchasing the
toy, or after purchasing the toy. In the temporal relationship theory, only the parent’s confusion is important. The parent might
have been confused in the pre-purchase period and the confusion
might have carried through into the post-purchase period. In the
alternative, the parent might have been confused in the prepurchase period, but while at the store, in-store disclaimers or point
of purchase posters dispelled her confusion. Because the easiest
identifiable person is this purchaser, many courts focus exclusively
on this person to determine whether any actionable confusion exists.86
85. See Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates
Trademarks to the Public Domain—With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392 (1993).
86. See id.; Molly S. Cusson, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors
to Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 217
(1995).
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To focus on purchaser confusion, though, is not enough. Many
people, other than the purchaser, should be considered as well.
The spatial relationship theory does exactly that. Recall that the
point of purchase is fixed in time. The spatial relationship theory
ascertains whom, other than the purchaser, is confused at the point
of purchase. Revisiting the toy store, we find that even though it is
the parent who actually purchases the toy, her child may have been
confused before the parent went to the store and remains confused
while the parent completes the purchase, and even afterward. Although the parent may have benefited from in-store disclaimers or
other confusion dispelling tactics, the child did not.
A plaintiff who focuses only on the purchaser limits the number of potential survey respondents. Similarly, a plaintiff’s case
would be severely undermined if the court accepted a defendant’s
argument that focused on the absence of purchaser confusion.
1. Judicial Focus on Purchaser Confusion
Under the temporal relationship theory, the focus is on the purchaser and when the purchaser may have been confused. Some
courts require proof that the purchaser be confused at the point of
purchase.87 Often, courts will consider the degree of care exercised by the purchaser.88 Courts typically employ an ordinary purchaser standard.89
Point of purchase confusion is the most widely analyzed factor
for determining when confusion occurs or vests. When courts apply this approach alone, however, they act contrary to the intent
behind the 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act,90 which deleted
87. See Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378, 207 U.S.P.Q. 465
(1st Cir. 1980); McKee Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 738 F. Supp. 1272, 1275,
17 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1528 (E.D. Mo. 1990); American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited,
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 616, 221 U.S.P.Q. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Beneficial Corp. v.
Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450, 213 U.S.P.Q. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. See Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1870 (5th Cir. 1989); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg-Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487, 4
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1987); Maxim’s, Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 227
U.S.P.Q. 316, 320 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23.29.
89. See 3 A.R. CALLMAN, supra note 61, § 20.09; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, §
23.27-29.
90. Amendment of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. (76
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the word “purchaser.”91 Under that amendment, Congress intended to go beyond the actual purchaser and protect potential purchasers.92
After determining when confusion has occurred, the next inquiry is whether an appreciable number of ordinary purchasers are
likely to be confused.93 An ordinary purchaser is one who is expected to exercise that degree of care, caution, power, and perception appropriate to the kind of choice he faces in the marketplace.94
That was the standard applied in Hormel Foods v. Jim Henson
Productions,95 in which the court found no confusion between
Sp’am (a Muppet) and Spam (the meat product).96 The court
found the relevant inquiry to be whether an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled.97 As with
any reasonably prudent purchaser standard, there is no mathematical precision to predict when that threshold is met.98
There is an inverse relationship between the degree of care exercised and the likelihood of confusion.99 As the degree of care increases, the likelihood of confusion decreases.100 As consumers
become more careful, they are more likely to examine the goods or

Stat. 773) 896.
91. Id.
92. See S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2851.
93. See General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1987); Centaur
Communications, Ltd. v. ASM Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987);
Lever Brothers Co. v. American Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1982); McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979).
94. See 3 A.R. CALLMAN, supra note 61, § 20.09; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, §
23.27.
95. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
96. See id. at 502.
97. Id. (citing Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 58 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979)).
98. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988).
99. See Daddy’s Junky Music Stores v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d
275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997).
Mathematically, the inverse relationship is expressed as (Cd ∝ 1\ Loc) where Cd is
the degree of care and Loc is the likelihood of confusion.
100. See Daddy’s Junky, 109 F.3d at 285; U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6432, at *27 (D. Kan. 1998). But see Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v.
NBA Properties, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401, 1417 (finding that a high degree of care does
not necessarily reduce likelihood of confusion).
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services in question.101 Close scrutiny of goods and trademarks
generally reduces the likelihood that consumers will confuse similar marks.102 One method of identifying a careful consumer is to
focus on the cost of goods with respect to the proportionate care
exercised.103 As price increases, the likelihood of confusion decreases104 under the assumption that higher prices prompt consumers to exercise more care.105 Courts will assume that purchasers
are likely to be more discriminating and source conscious when
purchasing an expensive product.106 Arguably, purchasers of
expensive products take greater time in purchasing, investigate all
of the facts, shop for competing products, and spend money only
when convinced that a particular trademark on the trademarked
product is precisely what is desired.107 In making purchasing decisions regarding expensive goods, the reasonably prudent person
standard is elevated to the standard of the discriminating purchaser.108
Contrast consumer behavior with regard to costly goods with
consumer behavior during the purchase of low priced items. As

101. See Abraham Zion Corp. v. Harry P. Lebow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
102. See Russian Kurier, Inc. v. Russian Am. Kurier, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1204, 121011 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he sophistication of the buyers is relevant in this case in that a
newspaper is a product that may be purchased without careful scrutiny, thus increasing
the likelihood of confusion”).
103. See AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir.
1993); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
The cost of goods in relation to the care exercised can be expressed mathematically
as (P ∝ Cd) where P is the price of the good or service.
104. See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1989).
105. See Blue-Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir.
1989); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987).
106. See Blue-Bell, 864 F.2d at 1260; Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487. The assumption
is that where the consumer is buying an expensive product, he is likely to be deliberate in
his product selection and, therefore, in his differentiation between trademarks. See BlueBell, 864 F.2d at 1260; Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487.
107. See 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.08, at 5146, 5-148 (1993). Nevertheless, a properly trademarked good does not always reflect
what the consumer wanted. This frequently occurs in sales involving parallel importation
or gray market goods. See Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Act to Bar the Importation of Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 99 (1996).
108. Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23:28, at 130.

UPADHYE.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

TRADEMARK SURVEYS: THE RELEVANT UNIVERSE

569

the cost decreases, the level of care decreases because the good is
cheap and it is conducive to impulse buying.109 Because the purchaser is buying a low priced item and is shopping on impulse, the
purchase decision is made with little or no thought nor any advance preparation.110 Therefore, very little care is exercised.111
Another standard, which is not directly related to the price of
the product, determines whether the purchaser is a professional
buyer, that is, an individual who has come to the purchasing decision with knowledge about the goods or services.112 This group is
normally held to a higher standard.113 But courts sometimes comingle the standards of care regarding professional status with
price.114 That results in an artificially high standard on the ordinary, albeit professional, purchaser if the purchased product is expensive.115 For example, if the price of the good is low, then a low
burden will be imposed. Due to the professional status of the purchaser, however, a higher burden is imposed, which inevitably
leads to a finding of no confusion as the professional standard
dominates over the price standard.116 But some courts have found
a likelihood of confusion even when dealing with expensive goods,
and the purchasers were expected to exercise a high degree of

109. See Beer Nuts v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 926 (10th Cir. 1986);
Knorr-Narhmittel, A.G. v. Reese Finer Foods, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 787, 794 (D.N.J. 1988).
110. See TV Land v. Viacom Int’l, 908 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting
that consumers take less time purchasing low cost items and haste increases the possibility of confusion).
111. See BeerNuts, 805 F.2d at 926; see also 1 GILSON, supra note 107, § 508, at 5146.
112. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23.29.
113. See id.
114. See Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal
Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 45 (1994).
115. See id.
116. See Blue-Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989);
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987); cf. Fuji Photo Film
Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 595, 225 U.S.P.Q. 540 (5th Cir.
1985); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808 (9th Cir.
1979); Truck Equipment Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220-21, 191
U.S.P.Q. 79 (8th Cir. 1976); Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d
1190, 1195, 171 U.S.P.Q. 769 (2d Cir. 1971); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg
Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17, 180 U.S.P.Q. 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
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care.117
One situation warranting careful examination is that where the
purchaser was confused prior to making the purchase but was no
longer confused at the point of purchase. Under this analysis, actionable confusion can exist early in the purchase decision time
line, even though at the time of purchase, there is no longer any
confusion. For example, in HRL Associates, Inc. v. Weiss Associates, Inc.,118 the marks covered computerized maintenance, inventory, and equipment tracking software.119 The price of the software ranged from $6,000 to $10,000 and generally was purchased
after the buyer was extensively exposed to literature and had experimented with the actual software.120 Oftentimes, the evaluation
period lasted over nine months after first contact.121 To this end,
the defendant argued that any initial confusion was dispelled by
virtue of the buyer’s protracted discussion.122 In addition, the defendant argued that the potential consumers were sophisticated and
were not confused at the point of sale.123
The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“TTAB”) ruled in
HRL Associates that the “Trademark Act does not make a distinction between confusion arising at an early stage in the purchasing
process and confusion arising at a later stage.”124 The TTAB’s rationale was that the Lanham Act prohibited registration of marks
that were likely to cause confusion between the marks, irrespective
of when and where this confusion occurred in the marketing or the
sale.125 Furthermore, the TTAB stated that the confusion to the potential purchaser, early in the purchasing decision, was just as injurious as any confusion in the actual purchaser, during or after the
time of purchase.126 Most important, the TTAB noted that the so-

117. See Fuji Photo Film, 754 F.2d 591; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Truck Equipment, 536
F.2d at 1220-21.
118. 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1819 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1822.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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phistication of the purchaser in this particular scenario was not
enough to overcome the likelihood of confusion of potential purchasers early in the purchase decision time line.127
It is established that focussing purely on the purchaser leads to
a finding in contradiction of the plain language of the Lanham Act.
In addition, a focus on purchasers limits the universe of consumers
that can participate in the trademark survey. Out of the entire universe of people, the set of all consumers—purchasers and nonpurchasers—is greater than the set of purchasers. Therefore, to
provide for a meaningful survey with the greatest chance of demonstrating confusion in the consuming public, the survey must
identify another universe of non-purchasers who are also confused.
2. Judicial Focus on Non-Purchaser Confusion
Under the spatial relationship theory, confusion of purchasers
and non-purchasers are equally important. Arguably, considering
non-purchasers is more important to a plaintiff because of the increase in possible survey respondents. Since the 1962 amendment
to the Lanham Act, some courts have expanded the likelihood of
confusion beyond the point of sale purchaser in order to incorporate the potential purchasers and the general public.128 The potential purchaser is one who is contemplating a purchase based on a
desire to buy a certain product.129 The general public is comprised
of the people who observe others using the goods, but who are not
contemplating an imminent purchase.130 As with purchaser confusion, there are three types of non-purchaser confusion: (1) pre-sale
confusion, (2) point of purchase confusion, and (3) post-sale confusion.

127. Id. at 1823.
128. See Pollack, supra note 85, at 1485; Landscape Forms v. Columbia Cascade
Co., 113 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he likelihood of confusion test concerns not
only potential purchasers but also the general public.”); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d
803, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the jury could consider confusion of members of
the general public as well as the purchasing public).
129. See Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991).
130. See generally Pollack, supra note 85 (describing non-purchaser observers).
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i. Pre-Sale Confusion
In the wake of the 1962 amendment, the courts have acknowledged the confusion of potential customers.131 In an early case,
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc.,132 the court also
dealt with pre-sale confusion.133 In this case, the plaintiff used
“COMSAT” as a registered trade name and service mark in its
worldwide satellite communications system.134 Defendant, Comcet, Inc. (“Comcet”), marketed communication computers to process data sent over telephone and teletype lines.135 According to the
court, the case’s outcome turned on the likelihood of confusion
among prospective consumers.136 In addition, the court noted that,
when the parties are not competitors, the infringement issue rests
on the likelihood of confusion about the source or sponsorship of
the goods and services marketed.137 Despite the lack of an relationship between the goods, Comcet argued that its purchasers are
so sophisticated and so knowledgeable that they would not be confused.138 The court held, however, that “the expertise of purchasers does not always assure the absence of confusion. Even buyers
of specialized products can assume, even be it wrongfully, that related companies are the source of goods despite them being noncompetitive goods.”139
Despite any sophistication of the consumer, pre-sale confusion
can exist even if consumers do not exercise any significant care.140
If potential customers are lured away from the senior user because
the junior user utilized a confusingly similar mark, the result is presale confusion that is actionable. In addition, pre-sale confusion, if

131. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
132. 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1247.
135. See id. at 1249.
136. Id. at 1252.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See Source Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding presale confusion using the pecuniary interest rationale versus
a confusion rationale).
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it exists, can bolster a showing of actual confusion.141
In Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,142 the plaintiff, Grotrian Steinweg, sued the Steinway
& Sons, the senior user, for a declaratory judgment143 that Grotrian
Steinweg’s name did not infringe on Steinway & Sons’s trademark
or trade names for pianos.144 On the basis of surveys conducted by
parties, the trial court found the presence of actual confusion between the marks.145 Despite the high cost of the pianos, costing
from $5,000 to $13,000, the sophistication of the consumer was
not enough to eliminate confusion.146
On appeal, the court acknowledged that the impact of confusion was significant when the parties were in direct competition
over a small class of consumers.147 Thus, it was inescapable that a
potential purchaser of a piano, upon hearing the name Grotrian
Steinweg, would associate Grotrian Steinweg’s product with that
of Steinway & Sons.148 The Grotrian court held that actual confusion or potential confusion at the point of purchase need not be
shown to prevail in trademark infringement.149 Therefore, according to the Grotrian court, confusion on the part of potential consumers is an influential part of the likelihood of confusion analysis.150 The Grotrian case is special because, despite a showing of
actual confusion, the court also examined pre-sale confusion.

141. See Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Mich. 1994); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags:
An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 248 (1998).
142. 365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir.
1975).
143. Id. A declaratory judgment action may be entertained in the district courts.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994). A declaratory judgment action is brought usually by a junior user who seeks a declaration that its use of the mark will not infringe the rights of the
senior user. Moreover, if the mark is registered, a declaratory judgment action may be
brought to invalidate such a registration. Consistent with the terminology of this Article,
in a declaratory judgment action, the junior user is the plaintiff.
144. See Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. at 709.
145. See id. at 716.
146. See id.
147. See Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1340.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1342.
150. Id. at 1341-42.
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Although potential consumer confusion has been accepted as a
theory, it is not required. In Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of
Canada,151 the court rejected the Royal Bank of Canada’s argument that a showing of actual confusion was required.152 The court
held that the legal construct only required that some confusion be
proved likely, not that it must be shown to persist.153 In this particular case, Royal Bank of Canada (“Royal Bank”), the defendant,
used a lion in marketing its banking services.154 Dreyfus Funds,
Inc. (“Dreyfus Funds”), the plaintiff, sued to enjoin further use of
the Royal Bank lion.155 Royal Bank argued that the relevant consumers were sophisticated and used great care in conducting business with either Royal Bank or Dreyfus Funds.156 The court rejected Royal Bank’s argument that the statutory construction
required a showing of potential purchaser confusion, and that the
confusion carried through the purchasing process.157 This case reiterated that actual confusion of the purchaser was neither required
nor a predicate for winning trademark infringement.
In situations where the potential consumer will never have the
opportunity to inspect the goods or have a face-to-face encounter
with point of purchase confusion obviators, some courts have held
this not to be problematic.158 In Television Enterprises Network,
Inc. v. Entertainment Network, Inc.,159 the court entertained a dispute over the use of the trademark “TEN.”160 According to the
court, although the programs were expensive, they were not expensive enough to dispel the likelihood of confusion.161 Because most
commercial transactions were over the phone, the potential purchaser may not have known with whom they were speaking.162
151. 525 F. Supp. 1108, 213 U.S.P.Q. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
152. Id. at 1124.
153. Id. at 1119.
154. Id. at 1111.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1122.
157. Id.
158. See Television Enters. Network, Inc. v. Entertainment Network, Inc., 229
U.S.P.Q. 47 (D.N.J. 1986).
159. 229 U.S.P.Q. 47 (D.N.J. 1986).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 49.
162. See id.
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Thus even if a deal was not consummated, the initial confusion
was damaging and wrongful.163
In Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers, GmbH,164 the court was
presented with the problem wherein actual consumers of one company were also potential consumers of the other.165 Complicating
matters further, both the plaintiff and defendant companies were
started by the same person, but in different countries.166 The parties argued that potential consumer confusion was not present due
to the consumers being in different countries.167 The plaintiff sued
to enjoin the defendant from using “Krupp-Koppers” as a trademark in the United States.168 Although a common owner founded
both companies, the only relationship between them was one of direct competition.169
The court ruled that the likelihood of confusion cannot be considered in a vacuum; it must be determined with respect to certain
persons.170 Also, according to the court, the 1962 Amendment
does not restrict actionable confusion to purchasers.171 Therefore,
the court used a broad interpretation of what constituted forbidden
confusion and the class of people that the 1962 amendment was
designed to protect.172 In the end, the relevant consumer universe
included a class of potential consumers from foreign countries.173
Pre-purchase confusion may exist and be actionable even
where there is extensive in-person discussion and personal attention in the purchase. In an interesting case, a prior mark holder

163. See id.
164. 210 U.S.P.Q. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 713
167. See id. at 718. Plaintiff’s company engaged in the design, engineering, and
construction of coal gasification plants, cokes, smelters, and blast furnaces. See id. at
712. Mr. Koppers in Germany founded defendant’s company for the same purpose (except it did not manufacture things) prior to Koppers coming to the United States and
starting the plaintiff-company. See id. at 713.
168. See id. at 714.
169. See id. at 713.
170. Id. at 717.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
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opposed the applicant’s mark at the TTAB.174 The underlying
products were expensive computer software management tools,
which were sold to the consumer after extensive negotiations and
discussion.175 The applicant argued that although there might have
been initial confusion, there was no confusion at the time of purchase because of the lengthy negotiations.176 Basically, the applicant argued that, because the consumers were sophisticated, after
the extended evaluation of the products and the discussions, there
was no confusion at the time of purchase.177 The TTAB held that
pre-sale confusion was actionable by the opposer because confusion of the potential consumer early in the purchase decision was
just as likely to cause injury to the opposer as confusion arising
later.178 On appeal of the TTAB decision, the Federal Circuit did
not address the issue of initial confusion, but nonetheless affirmed
the decision of the TTAB and held that there was a likelihood of
confusion.179
ii. Point of Purchase Confusion
Confusion at the point of purchase is most often, measured via
the purchaser. Typically, however, there are others who, in their
confusion, may influence the purchaser. The best example is the
parent-child relationship. For example, in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v.
Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc.,180 the consumer did not exercise much
care when purchasing a relatively inexpensive product.181 Also, in
Toys “R” Us, the parent-purchaser was not the actual user of the
product. The parent purchased the product for use by her child,
and the parent-purchaser was influenced by the desires of the ac-

174. See HRL Assocs. v. Weiss Assocs., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1819 (T.T.A.B. 1989),
aff’d, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
175. See HRL Assocs., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1820.
176. See id. at 1822.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 1822-23.
179. HRL Assocs. v. Weiss Assoc., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
180. 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
181. Id. at 1199. As the cost increases, the level of care in choosing the products
increases. As the price decreases, however, the level of care paid decreases, as it did in
this case. See id.
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tual user.182 In another toy case, Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay
Toys,183 the relevant non-purchasers were the children who induced their parents to buy toys for them.184 These cases demonstrate that the children, at the time of the purchase by the parent,
were confused.
Similarly, while examining the influencers of the nonpurchasers in Electric Design and Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data
Systems Corp.,185 the court’s inquiry turned on whether actual or
potential purchasers were confused.186 The analysis encompassed
all individuals that might know of the services and might become
purchasers.187 The court ruled that it was an error to deny registration of a trademark without determining the identity of “the relevant persons”—simply because the parties sold goods in the same
field.188 The court broadly construed “purchasers” and “potential
purchasers” to include those persons, such as users, who might actually influence purchasers.189 In further qualifying the universe of
persons, the court held that, for commercially sold items, only
those users who might influence future purchasers could be “relevant persons.”190
The TTAB used an expansive view of non-purchaser confusion
in American Optical Corp. v. Siemens Aktiengesell-schaft.191 In
that case, the court ruled that the broad category of persons who
might be confused included purchasers and prospective purchasers

182. Id. at 1199.
183. 658 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1981).
184. Id. at 79.
185. 954 F.2d 713 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Where the Examining Attorney and TTAB determined that the application is not entitled to registration, the applicant may appeal this
registration denial to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1)
(1994). Section 21(a)(1) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part, for a right of appeal: “An applicant for registration of a mark . . . who is dissatisfied with the decision of
the Commissioner or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, may appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Id.
186. Electric Design, 954 F.2d at 718.
187. See id. at 716.
188. Id. at 719.
189. Id. at 718.
190. Id.
191. 213 U.S.P.Q. 510 (T.T.A.B. 1982).
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on all levels of distribution.192 It also included those involved in
the selection of the goods, namely, the decision making process.193
American Optical and the other relevant cases indicate that nonpurchaser confusion at the point of purchase can be interpreted
broadly to include those who accompany the purchaser to the store,
influence the purchaser’s decisions, or make the selection but do
not actually make the purchase.
iii. Post-Sale Confusion
Post-purchase confusion is really non-purchaser presale confusion. For example, consumer A purchases some goods and, later,
consumer B sees consumer A using the goods. Consumer B can be
confused as to the goods, which impacts on consumer B’s potential
purchase or decision to buy the good in the future. Thus, the initial
purchase by consumer A took place, with or without any confusion,
but the second-potential purchase by consumer B may be clouded
with confusion.
Such a situation can arise when consumer A purchases sneakers
bearing a trademark confusingly similar to a popular brand name
sneaker. If the sneakers portray some poor quality or workmanship, consumer B might wrongly attribute these defects to the more
popular sneaker. This may negatively impact the sales of the brand
name sneaker. Post purchase confusion is especially troublesome
where point of purchase displays are used to minimize or destroy
point of purchase confusion.194 In post-purchase confusion, these
disclaimers are not available for the non-point of sale potential
purchaser to observe.195
III. THE RELEVANT UNIVERSE OF CONSUMERS
There are several views as to whom the trademark laws are to
protect. Under the expansive view, the Lanham Act protects

192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 68 F.3d 362, 368 (9th Cir. 1995) (using disclaimers to obviate likelihood of confusion).
195. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 230
U.S.P.Q. 831 (2d Cir. 1986).
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against confusion of any kind on the part of anyone, without limitation as to purchaser or potential purchaser.196 Prior to the 1962
amendment, Lanham Act protection generally was limited to confusion by the purchaser. The 1962 amendment,197 however, specifically sought to remove that limitation and have confusion encompass non-purchasers.198 In contrast, under the limited view of
trademark protection, the focuses is on the purchaser, hence practitioners should pay particular attention to an opinion’s focus on the
purchaser.
Apparently, some courts fail to examine the plain language of
the statute, fail to examine the legislative history to determine the
scope and content of the words of the statute,199 and fail to examine the legislative history to understand the policy and purpose of
the statute.200 The consequence of those failures is the application

196. See Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221, 226
U.S.P.Q. 836 (5th Cir. 1985); Syntex Labs, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp.
45, 49-53, 166 U.S.P.Q. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971); Rolex
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1117 (S.D. Fla. 1986);
United States v. Hon, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1959 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Yamin, 868
F.2d 130, 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 2
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1536 (8th Cir. 1987); T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 763
(D.R.I. 1978); Ferrari, S.P.A. v. McBurnie, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1843 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Redken Labs, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 737 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (rejecting expansive
view).
197. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat. 773)
896. The 1962 Amendment deleted the word “purchasers” from section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), which now reads “to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.” Id.
198. Id. The legislative history contained the following rationale for the 1962
Amendment:
The bill proposes to revive the quoted expression to read “to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” The purpose of the proposed change is to
coordinate the language here with that used elsewhere and to omit the word
“purchasers.” Since the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as
well as to actual purchasers. The word purchasers is eliminated as to avoid the
possibility of misconstruction of the present language of the statute.
Id.
199. See Norfolk W.R. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 128
(1991); Negonsett v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894,
(1992); FDIC v. McSweeny, 976 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1992); Ward v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
45 F.3d 353, 354 (10th Cir. 1994); DeOsorio v. United States INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1043
(4th Cir. 1993); Mitson v. AG Eng’g & Dev. Co., 835 F. Supp. 572, 574 (D. Col. 1993).
200. See Dickerson v. New Banner, 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983); Crandon v. United
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of a legal doctrine that has been changed. As Justice Holmes
stated, it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.201 It is even more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have long
since vanished, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past.202
After recognizing that non-purchaser confusion is relevant,
identification of these non-purchasers is a troublesome task—
especially in light of the fact that failure to accurately determine
the proper universe of consumers can be fatal to the plaintiff’s
case. Nonetheless, compartmentalizing cases that identify different universes can help develop a cogent theory as to whose confusion is relevant. This Part identifies various categories of nonpurchasers who could be confused.
A. Users of the Goods or Services
Purchasers of the goods or services are most often those who
are confused; but not always. Non-purchaser confusion is also
relevant. One group of non-purchasers is the user of the underlying product. In Educational Testing Service v. Touchstone Applied
Science Associates, Inc.,203 the plaintiff marketed a computer based
reading program trademarked “BOOKWHIZ.”204 The defendant
marketed two whole language programs called “BROWSER” and
“BOOKWIZE.”205 The court concluded that although the purchasers of the two products were schoolteachers, administrators, and
the similarly sophisticated purchasers,206 it was the ultimate consumers, namely the school children, who might be confused because they lacked the sophistication to differentiate among the

States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Shoonejengen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995);
Tataronowiscz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Reese v. United States,
24 F.3d 228, 231 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Vincent Tassinari, Patent Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59 (1998).
201. O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
202. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 198, 299 (1986).
203. 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1865 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
204. Id. at 1865.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 1869.
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products.207
In In re Artic Electronics Co.,208 there was a dispute involving
use of the trademark “Mars” for an arcade game and for a bill-andcoin change machine.209 The court held that although the arcade
owner made the purchase, the game player was the ultimate user210
who would, perhaps, be unaware of the differences, hence confused.211 For example, if the change machine malfunctioned and
the person wrongly attributed the faultiness to the video game
manufacturer because of source confusion.212
Ultimate users who do not necessarily make the initial order for
the goods also me be confused. In Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co.,213 a
case involving color-coded shims to maintain spacing between
milling machinery parts, a sales representative made the initial
purchase by mail order.214 According to the court, the end user
could still become confused after receiving a product in the mail
and removing all point of sale disclaimers.215
In Health Net v. USA Healthnet, Inc.,216 the court broadly expanded the universe of relevant consumers to include subscribers,
doctors, hospitals, and not just direct consumers.217 The plaintiff
Health Net owned a service mark for “Health Net” as a health
maintenance organization (“HMO”) and as a preferred provider
organization (“PPO”).218 The defendant USA Healthnet, Inc.
(“USA Healthnet”) called for a narrow universe consisting of sophisticated insurance companies and major corporate benefits
managers.219 The plaintiff argued, on the other hand, that the universe included not only employer groups, subscribers, and mem-

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
220 U.S.P.Q. 836 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
Id. at 837
Id.
See id. at 838
See id.
213 U.S.P.Q. 568 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 570.
Id. at 574.
26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 1189.
See id. at 1188.
See id. at 1189.
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bers, but also physicians, hospitals, and other providers of medical
care.220 The court analyzed the sophistication of the consumers
and determined that, despite the sophistication of the large corporate entities, the employees of the entities were not sophisticated.221 The court found that it would be easy for those employees to think that the defendant’s PPO or HMO was associated with
the plaintiff’s services.222 In this case, the court parsed the sophistication of the consumers into its constituents and found a likelihood of confusion at the constituent level.
A particularly troublesome area of trademark law concerns the
resale of salvaged goods. For example, a salvage market occurs
when goods are damaged during transit, storage, fire, or flood, and
are subsequently resold at a reduced price. Often, however, the ultimate user is not aware that the goods were part of the damaged
lot. In the event that the ultimate user complains of deficient or
slightly damaged goods, the complaint would most likely be targeted at the manufacturer or the primary source of the goods. In
the absence of complaints, the source of the product does not learn
that users are developing unfavorable opinions of the product.
The salvaged goods problem appeared in Pioneer Liemel Fabrics, Inc. v. Paul Rothman Industries, Ltd.223 In Pioneer Liemel,
the plaintiff sold its fire damaged products to a middleman who, in
violation of the original plaintiff-jobber contract, later resold the
products to a retailer.224 The retailer sold the products to the actual
users, who ultimately complained of defects.225 The court noted
that because the plaintiff sold only high quality goods and did not
engage in the second-hand market of its products, users expected
to receive high quality goods.226 The court found without doubt
that, as some users received damaged goods of inferior or questionable quality, the plaintiff lost future sales and suffered damage

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Id. at 1097-98.
See id. at 1099-1100.
Id. at 1104.
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to its goodwill.227
B. Lenders, Lessors, and Investors
Within the category of non-purchasers whose confusion is
relevant, there is another group of consumers who may not even
see the product, but who may rely on their own memories as to the
mark. In Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholders Funding,228
the court ruled that in classifying a mark, the impact of the mark
and not the meaning of the term is important.229 There were two
classes of buyers in Rockland Mortgage: ordinary consumers generally seeking to refinance their mortgages, and professional consumers, such as realtors, generally seeking to obtain mortgages on
behalf of new and existing home buyers.230 When the class of buyers is mixed, the likelihood of confusion is measured against the
least sophisticated consumer.231 This means that a likelihood of
confusion can be found even if professional buyers may not be
confused. The potential for duping investors or middlemen may
still exist.
Consistent with the theme of duping the investor, in Dynamet
Technology, Inc. v. Dynamet, Inc.,232 the plaintiff engaged in the
research and development of a prototype of titanium products.233
The plaintiff used “Dynamet” in the securities prospectus that it
mailed to potential investors.234 The defendant sold titanium rod
and wire and also used “Dynamet” in prospective mailings to potential investors, especially in the aircraft fastener industry.235 The
TTAB determined that both companies openly and notoriously
used the “Dynamet” name.236 The TTAB ruled in favor of the defendant based on its superior use of the mark.237 According to the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
835 F. Supp. 182, 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1270 (D. Del. 1993).
Id. at 1274.
See id. at 1276.
See id. at 1277.
593 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Id. at 1008.
See id. at 1009.
See id.
197 U.S.P.Q. 702 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
Id. at 712.

UPADHYE.TYP

584

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 8:549

court, the commitments from investors and financial support indicated that goodwill accumulated in the mark.238 In this case, the
defendant was able to prove prior rights in the mark based on the
expanded universe that included potential investors.
In Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co.,239 the district court
identified many different consuming groups as part of the relevant
universe of consumers likely to be confused.240 In that case, plaintiff Exxon Corp. (“Exxon”) was the successor in interest to the
merger of Standard Oil Company and Humble Oil and Refining
Company (“Humble Oil”).241 Exxon continued using the Humble
Oil trademark, albeit in sparing fashion.242 Exxon is a well-known
full-service oil and gas supplier, refiner, and explorer.243 The defendant, Humble Exploration Co. (“Humble Exploration”), started
as a company that made oil and gas exploration investments for
friends and clients of the company’s founders.244 Later, Humble
Exploration actively explored for gas and oil on its own, but generally limited its activities to a five county area in southeast Texas.245
When defendant used the name “HUMBLE” as its trade name,
Exxon sued.246
In analyzing the likelihood of confusion, the Exxon court recognized that several groups of consumers were involved, including
as common purchasers, suppliers, investors, lessees, and landowners.247 The court implicitly accepted as evidence of actual confusion the fact that lessors and investors in defendant’s oil exploration services often asked whether the defendant was connected
with the plaintiff.248 The court recognized that, because the defendant used the name of the well-established plaintiff Exxon, the

238. Id.
239. 214 U.S.P.Q. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 217 U.S.P.Q.
1200 (5th Cir. 1983).
240. Id. at 463.
241. See id. at 455.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 455-56.
244. See id. at 456.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 461.
248. Id. at 462.
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probability existed that potential lessors or investors might engage
in business with the defendant under the false impression that the
defendant was affiliated with the plaintiff. The salient point is that
the purchasers of the defendant’s products were oil retailers, such
as gas stations, yet the confused consumer universe included landowners or investors who were not in the market for defendant’s
services. The Fifth Circuit found no error in using such a broad
universe.249
C. Distributors, Suppliers, Wholesalers, and Retailers
Distributors, suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers comprise another category of non-purchasers whose confusion is relevant to
trademark infringement. In Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch & Lowy,250
a typical trade dress case, the plaintiff manufactured lamps and
sued under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, claiming that its
lamps did not infringe upon the trade dress of the defendant’s
“DOVE” brand lamps.251 The lamp was not inherently distinctive,
thus, under a trade dress infringement analysis, the defendant
needed to demonstrate distinctiveness252 by showing secondary
meaning.253 To prove secondary meaning, the court determined
the universe of consumers to be “persons interested in home and
office designs, including architects, designers, decorators, and upscale sophisticated consumers.”254 The court noted that, although
these people may be purchasers, they also influence the home or
office owners to purchase the lamps.255 In Lon Tai Shing, retailers
and wholesalers imported the lamps for distribution to designers,
other distributors, and, in rare circumstances, to end consumers.256
After finding secondary meaning in the lamps, the inquiry focused on the likelihood of confusion. The court expanded the uni249. Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1200, 1201 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1983).
250. 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
251. Id.
252. The defendant in a declaratory judgment action is the putative mark holder.
253. See id. at 1087.
254. Id. (citing PAF S.R.L. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)).
255. Id. at 1088.
256. Id.
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verse of consumers to include not only potential consumers, but
also wholesalers and retailers.257 In the trademark survey proffered
by the plaintiff, the survey expert had posed as a shopper under the
pretext of wanting to purchase the lamp or purporting to purchase
the lamp on someone else’s behalf.258 In response, the defendant
attacked the survey methodology. The defendant criticized the
choice of suburban areas as survey locations;259 the defendant
criticized the failure to include discount stores in the survey intercept,260 and the defendant asserted that survey respondents were
salespeople who tended to push their own products on purchasers.261 In dismissing those arguments, the court found that the survey response of eighteen percent was adequate to prove confusion.262 The court also noted that where the universe of consumers
is sophisticated—as it was with the sophisticated interior designers
in Lon Tai Shing—a smaller universe is allowed and a smaller percentage of actual confusion need be shown.263 Therefore, practitioners should expand the universe of their surveys to encompass
sophisticated consumers whenever possible, so that scant incidence
of actual confusion will tip the balance in favor of the survey proponent.
In Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House,264 where the issue
was the trade dress of dictionary dust jackets,265 MerriamWebster’s only evidence of actual confusion was the testimony of
several of its own salesmen, the testimony of one person who was
giving the dictionary away, the testimony of another who read a
review in a magazine, and photographs of Merriam-Webster and
Random House dictionaries shelved side-by-side at bookstores.266
There was no testimony by any retail or wholesale consumer who

257. Id. at 1090; see also Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Elsner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980,
205 U.S.P.Q. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
258. See Lon Tai Shing, 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1093.
259. See id. at 1096.
260. See id. at 1095-96.
261. See id. at 1096-97.
262. Id. at 1097.
263. Id. at 1097-98.
264. 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1994).
265. Id. at 1011.
266. See id. at 1015.
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intended to buy a Merriam-Webster dictionary, but mistakenly
bought a Random House dictionary because of confusion between
the trade dresses.267 The court found that the lack of survey evidence counted against finding actual confusion.268 Thus, the court
concluded that Merriam-Webster failed to show actual confusion
affecting purchasers.269
In discussing the sophistication of the relevant consumer
group, the Merriam-Webster court stated that one must look to
“[t]he general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under
the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of
goods.”270 The court also noted that analysis of the sophistication
factor involved individuals who are likely to purchase the product.271 In this case, there were two pertinent classes of potential
consumers, retail booksellers and individuals.272
Generally, the retail booksellers were assumed to be sophisticated buyers.273 Moreover, to order the dictionaries, the retail
bookseller had to contact the particular publisher, and thus, it was
virtually inconceivable that a bookseller would call Random House
believing it was Merriam-Webster.274 Again, Merriam-Webster’s
claim is implicitly based on an unstated assumption of its virtual
anonymity as a dictionary publisher; that is, the consumer would
not be able to distinguish the source of the dictionaries.275
With regard to individual purchasers, the dictionaries were sold
at retail for approximately twenty dollars and designed for several
years of use.276 Moreover, individual purchasers of dictionaries

267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. (citing McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d
Cir. 1979).
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. See W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 576, 25
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1593 (2d Cir. 1993).
274. See Merriam-Webster, 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1015.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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are generally literate.277 Therefore, designing the survey for the
mark owner in this case required a dual universe model that identified both retailers and individual users.278
Another query regards the results of a survey of wholesalers or
retailers that also includes ultimate end-users. In Essie Cosmetics,
Ltd. v. Dae Do International, Ltd.,279 the trade dress of nail polish
bottles and labeling were at issue.280 The plaintiff sold the bottles
to nail salons and beauty supply houses.281 The plaintiff interviewed survey respondents at various nail beauty trade shows and
tallied over a seventy-five percent positive response rate.282 The
court ruled that this response rate was more than adequate to demonstrate secondary meaning among the wholesalers and retailers.283
Furthermore, implicit in the decision, the court also noted that the
relevant universe of survey respondents included the ultimate enduser, that is, the consumer who walks into the salons and requests a
nail polish service.284 Thus, in Essie Cosmetics case, the survey,
which included ultimate end-users who increased the positive response rate, assisted in proving that the nail polish bottle trade
dress had acquired secondary meaning.
D. Observers
Observers or passersby comprise another group of nonpurchasers whose confusion is relevant to trademark infringement
claims.285 In Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc.,286 the defendant
manufactured knit shirts bearing a breast pocket emblem that was
substantially similar to the famous polo player horseman symbol

277. See id.
278. See id.
279. 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1849 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
280. Id. at 1850.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 1850-51.
283. Id. at 1854.
284. Id.
285. See Insty Bit v. Poly-Tech Indus., 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1961, 1967 (8th Cir.) (“[A]n
action for trademark infringement may be based on consumer confusion of consumers
other than direct purchasers, including observers of an allegedly infringing product in use
by a direct purchaser.”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1085 (1997).
286. 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1444 (4th Cir. 1985).
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used by Polo Fashions, Inc. (“Polo”).287 The defendant argued that
any similarity between the emblems would not confuse a consumer
because the shirt tag clearly indicated that the shirt was not an authentic Ralph Lauren Polo shirt.288 Although such a point of purchase disclaimer might suffice to dispel any point of purchase confusion in certain circumstances, the court expanded the universe of
people whose confusion is relevant to include observers.289 The
court noted that in the post-purchase context, an observer or passerby would not be able to see the shirt tag, and hence the source
indication disclaimer would not dispel their confusion.290 On seeing the polo player symbol, it was likely that the observer or passerby would identify the shirt with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s
reputation would suffer damage if the shirt appeared to be of poor
quality.291 Therefore, in a trademark survey, the universe of relevant consumers, apparently at least in the clothing line, would include general observers or passersby.
The same situation occurred in Lois Sportwear, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Levi Strauss & Co.,292 wherein Lois Sportwear, U.S.A., Inc. (“Lois
Sportwear”) produced jeans with a back pocket stitch design that
was strikingly similar to that used by Levi Strauss & Co. (“Levi
Strauss”).293 Interestingly enough, Lois Sportwear’s product quality was not inferior to Levi Strauss’s product quality.294 In addition, Lois Sportwear sold its high-quality jeans in both upscale
stores and cut-rate discount stores.295 The appellate court noted
that confusion could exist in the observers and passersby.296 This
confusion, according to the court, likely existed when observers
saw the stitching patterns on the Lois Sportwear jeans, believed
that Levi Strauss had finally entered the upscale jeans market, and
thus, wrongly believed that the upscale quality jeans were endorsed

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 1445.
See id. at 1446.
Id.
Id.
See id.
799 F.2d 867, 230 U.S.P.Q. 831 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 868.
See id. at 875.
See id. at 870.
Id. at 872-73.
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or affiliated with Levi Strauss.297 In arguing that the consumers
were sophisticated, the court recognized that, despite any consumer
sophistication in recognizing marks, in the post-purchase context, a
sophisticated passerby would in fact be confused by Lois Sportwear’s stitching pattern.298 Therefore, in designing a survey for an
item of clothing, the universe of consumers should include discount shoppers, sophisticated consumers, and general clothing
shoppers.
The Federal Circuit recently addressed observer confusion in
the post-sale context in Payless Shoesource Inc. v. Reebok International, Ltd.299 In that case, the appeals court held that the trial
court had engaged in an incomplete analysis by failing to examine
the existence of post-sale confusion among observers.300 Moreover, the Federal Circuit agreed with Reebok International’s
(“Reebok”) argument that confusion could occur in post-sale observers, who see Payless Shoesource’s (“Payless”) shoes on the
street and think they closely resemble those of Reebok.301 Those
passersby would likely note the inferior quality and falsely attribute it to Reebok, thereby causing damage to Reebok’s reputation.302 The inclusion of observers is important because it provides
a larger universe from which to generate evidence of secondary
meaning or actual confusion. It is noteworthy, however, the ordinary observer is not automatically a valid respondent because a respondent must be a potential consumer of the product in ques-

297. Id. at 875.
298. Id. at 875-76.
299. 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding patent infringement and over
decisions on appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Normally, trademark decisions by the Federal Circuit are by virtue of appeal from the Trademark Office. In Payless Shoesource, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over the case due to design patent
infringement with a supplementary claim for trademark infringement. In cases where the
Federal Circuit is not vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit will
use the law of the sister circuit of the district court sits where the case originated. See
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 702, 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1885, 1890
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
300. Payless Shoesource, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1519.
301. Id.
302. See id.
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tion.303 Therefore, preliminary screening of observers must necessarily include a question geared to whether the observer is also a
potential consumer of the product.
Finally, the sophistication of the direct purchaser is not relevant
when examining the observer in the post-sale confusion context.
That is so because, in examining post-sale confusion of an observer, the sophistication of the direct purchaser can not obviate or
vitiate observer confusion, as no relationship exists between the
parties, except for the observer’s visual experience. Such a situation presented itself in T. Anthony Ltd. v. Malletier,304 which concerned the monogramming of luggage.305 The court, in adopting
post-sale confusion of observers, noted that the sophistication of
the buyer is not relevant in this situation.306 The court did not accept the defendant’s argument that sophistication of the buyer dispelled any observer confusion.307
IV. EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF AN IMPROPER SURVEY UNIVERSE
It can be difficult to identify the relevant universe of consumers
whose confusion must be proved in a trademark infringement case.
Like any other evidence in litigation, the ultimate determination as
to whether the universe is proper and useable will occur only at
trial. In the event that the universe is improper, it is important to
understand whether the survey has any utility at trial. Although a
faulty survey could be categorically excluded as non-probative and
prejudicial if admitted, it also could be admitted as relevant but not
dispositive evidence.
A. Cases Excluding a Defective Universe Survey
There are several cases in which a proffered survey proffered
was given no weight.308 For example, in Spraying Systems Co. v.
303. See Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1865, 1875 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(“[T]o be probative and meaningful, surveys must rely upon responses by potential customers of the products in question.”).
304. 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
305. Id. at 1215.
306. Id. at 1216.
307. Id. at 1218.
308. See, e.g., Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1181 (7th Cir.
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Delavan, Inc.,309 the case concerned whether the plaintiff’s mark
had achieved protection by virtue of having attained secondary
meaning.310 The plaintiff offered three surveys to demonstrate the
secondary meaning of the mark.311 The Seventh Circuit criticized
the universe because it included only the ultimate purchasers,
namely farmers, of the spray jets, when a significant number of
spray jets had been sold to distributors and equipment manufacturers.312 Thus, the universe of farmers was under-inclusive and vitiated any value of the survey.313
In Jordache Enterprises v. Levi Strauss & Co.,314 the case concerned the use of “Jordache Basics 101” and Levi Strauss’s mark
“501” for jeans.315 The district court criticized Levi Strauss’s survey evidence as having a defective universe and found that the
survey was inconclusive.316 The court noted that the survey was
irrelevant because it polled only respondents who had worn or purchased jeans in the last six months.317 As a result, the universe did
not include potential purchasers of jeans.318 The court also reaffirmed that a survey must rely on responses by potential customers
of the products in question.319
An under-inclusive universe, which excludes one or more relevant groups, is ground for rejecting a survey.320 This situation occurred in American Basketball Ass’n v. AMF Voit, Inc.,321 which
1992) (ruling that a survey had no evidentiary value); Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1721 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); American Basketball Ass’n v. AMF
Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981, 177 U.S.P.Q. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same), aff’d, 487 F.2d
1393, 180 U.S.P.Q. 290 (2d Cir. 1973).
309. 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1992).
310. Id.
311. See id. at 1186.
312. Id.
313. See id. at 1187 n.5.
314. 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1721 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
315. Id. at 1722.
316. Id. at 1729.
317. Id. at 1729.
318. See id. at 1729-30.
319. Id. at 1729.
320. See American Basketball Ass’n v. AMF Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981, 177
U.S.P.Q. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1393, 180 U.S.P.Q. 290 (2d Cir. 1973).
321. 358 F. Supp. 981, 177 U.S.P.Q. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1393,
180 U.S.P.Q. 290 (2d Cir. 1973).
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concerned the red, blue, and white color of basketballs.322 The
plaintiff surveyed males between ages twelve and twenty-three
who played basketball within the last year.323 The court criticized
this universe as being too narrow because it did not encompass all
people who were in the market to buy basketballs.324
B. Cases Giving Some Weight to a Defective Universe Survey
A number of cases demonstrate that a survey with a defective
universe is entitled to some evidentiary weight. In McDonald’s
Corp. v. McBagel’s Inc.,325 the universe of consumers was slightly
flawed but did not render the survey useless.326 McDonald’s, the
well-known fast food giant sued a New York-based bagel bakery
and restaurant,327 which objected to a survey whose universe included 504 randomly selected people nationwide and 500 randomly selected persons within New York State.328 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the survey universe was too
broad, noting that the broad universe was controlled by asking respondents whether they had eaten in a fast food restaurant re-

322. Id.
323. See id. at 986.
324. Id. at 446. Survey evidence is often criticized for being too narrow. See, e.g.,
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1194,
1204 (D.N.J. 1987) (noting that the universe of Advil-tablet users was too narrow), aff’d,
834 F.2d 368 (3rd Cir. 1987); Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75,
215 U.S.P.Q. 358, 363 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (noting that the universe of serious runners
skewed results because it should have included runners purchasing expensive and inexpensive shoes), aff’d, 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983); Ferrari, S.P.A. v. McBurnie, 11
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1843 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (affording some weight to a survey based on a narrow
universe); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Comstock Partners, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1029, 17 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1599, 1603 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (criticizing an universe that only sampled investors or
registered representatives and failed to include people who would actually avail themselves of the defendant’s products); Universal Frozen Foods Co. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 389, 394, 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1856, 1860 (D. Or. 1987) (finding that an universe
of thirty distributors was too narrow because it excluded restaurant operators who served
curly fries); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1740, 1744 (9th Cir. 1989) (criticizing an universe because it had narrow age restrictions).
325. 1 U.P.S.Q. 2d 1761 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
326. Id. at 1768.
327. Id. at 1761.
328. See id. at 1768.
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cently.329 The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the
universe was too broad because it may have included respondents
who had worked for the plaintiff.330 Despite any shortcomings in
the universe identified, the survey was still entitled to some probative value.
In Insty Bit v. Poly-Tech Industries,331 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision not to grant any weight to a survey, ruling ruled that although the universe was small, the survey
respondents’ answers created genuine facts for trial.332 The Eighth
Circuit did not adopt a theory that small universes are per se allowable; but rather, in this context, merely ruled that a survey with
small universe can demonstrate sufficient issues of material fact to
avoid summary judgment.333
In limiting its ruling to the summary judgment issue, the Eighth
Circuit cited the survey for methodological errors, wherein the survey expert did not narrow the universe by asking respondents
whether they intended to buy the products in the future.334 The ruling seemed to indicate that the universe should be narrowed to include those people who manifest an intent to buy the underlying
product in the future, and it raised the prospect of exclusion of the
survey at trial.
Similarly, in Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca,335 a district
court held the universe of consumers to be too broad, but nonetheless held the survey to be probative. The plaintiff proffered two
surveys on the issue of likelihood of confusion between its mark
“DOM PERIGNON,” the celebrated champagne, and the mark
“DOM POPIGNON,” the defendant’s gourmet popcorn.336 The
first survey used a universe that included respondents who shopped
in gourmet stores, were between twenty-five and sixty-four years
old, did not work in liquor stores, and did not restrict themselves to

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
Id.
95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1085 (1997).
Id. at 672.
See id.
Insty-Bit, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1966-67.
31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1865 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Id. at 1866-67.
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champagne or wine drinkers.337 The second survey proffered by
the plaintiff expanded the universe to include general retail stores,
persons of legal drinking age—twenty-one—and male and female
respondents in proportion to their existence in the surrounding
community.338 The court criticized the universe as being overinclusive because it included all persons of legal drinking age.339
The court held to the general rule that, to be probative, the universe
must include respondents who are potential customers of the products. The court criticized the survey for including respondents
merely because they were legally allowed purchase liquor.340 The
court noted that the better definition of universe would include
groups of consumers who were in the market for champagne or,
better yet, “DOM PERIGNON.”341 Nevertheless, the court did not
categorically reject the survey; it afforded it some probative
weight.342
In Weight Watchers, International, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,343 a
case wherein both plaintiff and defendant introduced surveys, the
court stated that both survey universes were flawed but gave some
weight to plaintiff’s survey and rejected the defendant’s survey.
The court criticized the plaintiff’s survey as being too broad because it was based on women, between eighteen and fifty-five
years old, who had purchased frozen food entrees in the past six
months, and who had attempted to lose weight through diet or exercise during the previous year.344 The court declared that the universe should have been limited to those persons who had purchased diet frozen entrees or who had tried to lose weight through
diet alone—not through exercise.345 Nevertheless, the court gave
the plaintiff’s survey some weight.346
The defendant’s survey, however, was accorded no weight.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
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Id. at 1331.
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Like the plaintiff’s survey. The defendant’s survey was criticized
for failing to reference those losing weight by diet or those in the
market for frozen diet foods.347 The defendant’s universe included
males and females, between eighteen and fifty-five years of age,
who ate any frozen meal in the last six months or helped select frozen meals for the household.348 The court found that the errors in
the universe—when coupled with additional flaws in design and
interpretation of the survey—so undermined its probative value
that it deserved no evidentiary weight.349
C. Reconciling an Improper Universe As Too Broad Or Too
Narrow
In reading the courts’ discussions regarding the effect of a too
narrow or too broad universe, one trend appears to surface. A
court will give some weight to an survey universe that is too broad,
but will not give any weight to a survey universe that is too narrow. The reason may be that a broad universe is overinclusive,
hence it necessarily encompasses the actual and correct universe.
Consequently, the results of a survey based on an overbroad universe is still probative over how the underlying correct universe
would respond to the questions. Nonetheless, an overbroad survey
usually is not dispositive to the question of actual confusion.
Conversely, a survey based on too narrow an universe does not
include even the minimum correct universe. Thus, no matter how
well the survey is conducted, it will exclude some relevant group
of consumers and cannot be used to foretell how those consumers
would respond to the survey questions. Practitioners should accordingly err on the side of caution with an over-inclusive universe
so that its results are probative.

347. See id.
348. See id. at 1332.
349. See id. at 1333.
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CONCLUSION
By examining confusion in the context of how, when, and
which consumers are confused, a survey proponent can maximize
the value of a trademark survey. Given that surveys are becoming
increasingly important and probative to the underlying issues of
secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion, dilution, and genericide, a properly conducted trademark survey that examines the
relevant universe of consumers is critical. It is essential to analyze
the propriety of a relevant universe because that universe will dictate the outcome of the case.

